




1.  Models with discrete dependent variables 
 
 




 Models with discrete dependent variables  
 
Can have qualitative response models where the dependent variable is discrete 
rather than a continuous variable. Types of discrete choice models:  
 
a) Dichotomous, binary or dummy variables  
 
Such models take on the value of zero or one. For example modelling the 



























 b) Polychotomous variables  
 
These take on a discrete number and can be split into:  
 
i. unordered variables  
These are variables for which there is no natural ranking of the alternatives. 














unemployed is i person if
employed self is i person if
employee an is i person if








ii. Ordered variables  
With such variables the outcomes have a natural ranking. For example suppose 










health excellent in is i person if
health fair in is i person if



































 I.  Ordered Choice Models 
 
The Ordered Probit Model 
 
The model is built around the latent variable framework in the same way as the 
binomial probit model: 
 
ε + = β x' * y  
 
























 This adheres to a type of censoring.  
 
The µ’s are unknown parameters to be estimated along with the β. 
 
Basing the above upon having normally distributed errors across observations, 
normalising the mean and variance to 0 and 1 respectively (as with the 
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For the probabilities to be positive we must have  1 J− < < < < µ µ µ L 2 1 0  EXAMPLE 
 
- The 1998 Workplace Employee Relations Survey WERS (Department of 
Trade and Industry, 1999) can be used to model EFFORT. 
 
- 1998 WERS has matched employer-employee information and is a nationally 
representative survey of workplaces with 10+ employees.  
 
- The survey offers comprehensive information on a sample of 28,215 
employees working in 1,782 establishments though our final data set (due to 
missing values) comprises 19,510 employees from 1,753 workplaces.  
 
A question asked to employees is: 
Do you agree or disagree that your job requires that you work very hard? 
 
The responses are categorized as:  
disagree strongly
disagree


















































-1 0 1 2 3 4
eff o rt
 
Clearly this variable has a natural ranking.  
Model effort as: 
 
fi fi fi Effort ε + = β x ' *  
 
where  * Effort  is the unobserved propensity of an individual i employed in firm 
f  to exert effort, a latent variable; Effort is the individual’s observed level of 
effort. 
 
Variables used to explain effort are the relative wage on offer in the firm, age, 






 VARIABLE    DESCRIPTION
 
Effort (Eff1) 
Do you agree or disagree that your job requires that you work very 
hard? 
Index 0=strongly disagree, 1=disagree, 2=neither agree nor disagree, 
3=agree, 4=strongly agree 
Relwfirm  Log individuals wage relative to the average firm wage  
Male  Dummy (0/1) equals 1 if  individual is male 
White  Dummy (0/1) equals 1 if  individual is white 
Health  Dummy (0/1) equals 1 if the individual is in good health 
Perm  Dummy (0/1) equals 1 if the individual has a permanent contract 
Tumem  Dummy (0/1) equals 1 if the individual is a trade union member 
Emp  Number of employees in the firm where the individual works 
Empsq  Number of employees squared fi fi fi fi fi fi Perm Health White Male lwfirm Re Effort 5 4 3 2 1 0 β β β β β β + + + + + =  
 





set mem 100m; 
set mat 100; 
set more off; 
use "E:\karl’s files\stata\L5-6.dta", clear; 
oprob eff1 relwfirm male white health perm tumem emp empsq; 
predict pp0 pp1 pp2 pp3 pp4, p; 
mfx compute, predict(outcome(1)); 
mfx compute, predict(outcome(2)); 
mfx compute, predict(outcome(3)); 






oprob eff1 relwfirm male white health perm  tumem emp empsq; 
 
Ordered probit estimates                          Number of obs   =      19510 
                                                  LR chi2(8)      =     470.30 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -22124.227                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0105 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        eff1 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    relwfirm |   .2761184   .0213419    12.94   0.000     .2342891    .3179477 
        male |  -.2547255   .0160936   -15.83   0.000    -.2862683   -.2231826 
       white |  -.1968963   .0440379    -4.47   0.000    -.2832089   -.1105836 
      health |   .0176182    .017328     1.02   0.309     -.016344    .0515805 
        perm |    .097243   .0335359     2.90   0.004     .0315138    .1629722 
       tumem |   .1364387   .0163371     8.35   0.000     .1044186    .1684588 
         emp |  -.0000811   .0000204    -3.97   0.000    -.0001211    -.000041 
       empsq |   6.11e-09   2.26e-09     2.70   0.007     1.67e-09    1.06e-08 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _cut1 |  -3.063746   .0722249          (Ancillary parameters) 
       _cut2 |  -1.966417   .0568277  
       _cut3 |  -1.001023   .0553364  
       _cut4 |   .3880693   .0550301  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
. predict p0 p1 p2 p3 p4, p;  
MARGINALS 
 
. mfx compute, predict(outcome(1)); 
 
Marginal effects after oprobit 
      y  = Pr(eff1==1) (predict, outcome(1)) 
         =    .036615 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
variable |      dy/dx    Std. Err.     z    P>|z|  [    95% C.I.   ]      X 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
relwfirm |  -.0213413      .00175  -12.18   0.000  -.024776 -.017907  -.071163 
    male*|   .0196653      .00136   14.46   0.000      .017   .02233   .513378 
   white*|   .0130344      .00249    5.23   0.000   .008152  .017917   .966376 
  health*|   -.001369      .00135   -1.01   0.312  -.004023  .001285   .680113 
    perm*|  -.0080722      .00299   -2.70   0.007  -.013932 -.002212   .941825 
   tumem*|  -.0103698      .00126   -8.25   0.000  -.012834 -.007905    .42081 
     emp |   6.27e-06      .00000    3.94   0.000   3.2e-06  9.4e-06   295.934 
   empsq |  -4.72e-10      .00000   -2.69   0.007  -8.2e-10 -1.3e-10    509435 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 







 . mfx compute, predict(outcome(2)); 
 
Marginal effects after oprobit 
      y  = Pr(eff1==2) (predict, outcome(2)) 
         =    .173017 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
variable |      dy/dx    Std. Err.     z    P>|z|  [    95% C.I.   ]      X 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
relwfirm |  -.0567923      .00445  -12.75   0.000  -.065522 -.048062  -.071163 
    male*|   .0521267      .00334   15.61   0.000   .045581  .058673   .513378 
   white*|   .0386936      .00821    4.72   0.000   .022611  .054776   .966376 
  health*|  -.0036283      .00357   -1.02   0.310  -.010632  .003375   .680113 
    perm*|  -.0203127      .00711   -2.86   0.004  -.034239 -.006386   .941825 
   tumem*|  -.0279082      .00334   -8.36   0.000   -.03445 -.021366    .42081 
     emp |   .0000167      .00000    3.96   0.000   8.4e-06  .000025   295.934 
   empsq |  -1.26e-09      .00000   -2.70   0.007  -2.2e-09 -3.4e-10    509435 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 










 . mfx compute, predict(outcome(3)); 
 
Marginal effects after oprobit 
      y  = Pr(eff1==3) (predict, outcome(3)) 
         =  .51022488 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
variable |      dy/dx    Std. Err.     z    P>|z|  [    95% C.I.   ]      X 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
relwfirm |  -.0126706      .00138   -9.21   0.000  -.015367 -.009974  -.071163 
    male*|   .0119798      .00117   10.22   0.000   .009681  .014278   .513378 
   white*|   .0166074       .0054    3.08   0.002   .006027  .027188   .966376 
  health*|  -.0007844      .00075   -1.05   0.296  -.002255  .000686   .680113 
    perm*|  -.0026572      .00045   -5.96   0.000  -.003531 -.001783   .941825 
   tumem*|  -.0068794      .00102   -6.77   0.000   -.00887 -.004888    .42081 
     emp |   3.72e-06      .00000    3.80   0.000   1.8e-06  5.6e-06   295.934 
   empsq |  -2.80e-10      .00000   -2.64   0.008  -4.9e-10 -7.3e-11    509435 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 










 . mfx compute, predict(outcome(4)); 
 
Marginal effects after oprobit 
      y  = Pr(eff1==4) (predict, outcome(4)) 
         =  .27804591 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
variable |      dy/dx    Std. Err.     z    P>|z|  [    95% C.I.   ]      X 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
relwfirm |   .0926318      .00716   12.93   0.000   .078589  .106675  -.071163 
    male*|  -.0854741       .0054  -15.84   0.000  -.096053 -.074895   .513378 
   white*|  -.0693456      .01618   -4.29   0.000  -.101054 -.037637   .966376 
  health*|   .0058994      .00579    1.02   0.308  -.005451   .01725   .680113 
    perm*|   .0317714      .01066    2.98   0.003   .010888  .052655   .941825 
   tumem*|   .0460378      .00554    8.30   0.000   .035173  .056903    .42081 
     emp |  -.0000272      .00001   -3.97   0.000  -.000041 -.000014   295.934 
   empsq |   2.05e-09      .00000    2.70   0.007   5.6e-10  3.5e-09    509435 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 













 Interpreting the marginal effects  
 
 
Comparing effort categories 4 to 3 i.e. strongly agreeing to the question: 
 Do you agree or disagree that your job requires that you work very hard?  
rather than answering ‘agrees’  
 
Then the impact of the relative wage earned by the individual in comparison to 
their workmates is that a 1% higher relative wage leads to a 9.3% higher 
probability of replying in the top category. 
 




 Calculating probabilities 
 
What is the probability of the following individual reporting the highest effort 
category:  
 
A male individual in good health on a permanent contract who isn’t a trade 
union member working in a firm of 13 has a wage is equal to the firm average:  
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+ + + + − Φ − = =
Empsq Emp Tumem
Perm Health White Male Relwfirm x y prob
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⎛ − − Φ − = = 338 . 0 388 . 0 1 4 x y prob  
 
from above z=0.726, so  ( ) 76608 . 0 = z φ   
 
 





⎛ x y prob  
 
browse p4 if relwfirm==0 & male==1 & white==1 & health==1 & perm==1 & 





– STATA takes longer to calculate marginal effects (when nose is not 
applied) than other packages such as LIMDEP; 
 
–This is more problematic from a research perspective. For instance in 
the above example WERS has info on employers and employees so it 
is possible to model intra-firm effects using a random effects ordered 




 Censored Dependent Variables 
 
Focus on continuous  variables and how to model economic relationships 
when censoring occurs in the data.  
 
In particular the focus will be upon: 
 
-  Truncation 
This occurs when trying to infer the characteristics of a population from a 
sample which is drawn from a restricted part of the underlying population – 
don’t observe the y or X’s. 
 
Should be contrasted with CENSORING 
 
-  Censoring 
This is common in micro datasets and occurs when the dependent variable   
ONLY is censored 
y
NOT the X’s.  Examples (amongst many others) of censored dependent variables which have 
appeared in the literature are: 
 
1. Household purchases of durable goods [Tobin  (1958), Econometrica]; 
 
2. The number of hours worked by women in the labour market [Quester and 
Greene (1982), Social Science Quarterly]; 
 
3. Debt accumulation and financial expectations [Brown, Garino, Taylor and 
Wheatley Price (2005), Economic Inquiry]. 
 
Each of these studies analyses a dependent variable which is truncated for a 





 Example of the Tobit Model – Modelling debt 
 
Model debt using UK data from the 2000 British Household Panel Survey 
(BHSP), which consists of 3,579 individuals so i=1,2,…,3,579. 
 
The BHPS is a random sample survey, carried out by the Institute for Social 
and Economic Research,  of each adult member from a nationally 
representative sample. For Wave one, interviews were conducted during the 
autumn of 1991. The same individuals are re-interviewed in successive waves 
– the latest available being wave twelve, collected in 2002.  
 







 VARIABLE DESCRIPTION 
lnDebt  Log total amount of debt reported by the individual 
Age  Age of the individual at date of interview 
lnSaving  Log amount saved each month 
lnIncome  Log usual gross monthly pay in current job 
lnWealth  Log (investments+housevalue+windfalls+unearned income) 
Marrried  Dummy variable (0/1) equals 1 if married or cohabiting 
Employed  Dummy variable (0/1) equals 1 if employed 
Degree  Dummy variable (0/1) equals 1 if highest qualification is a degree 
A’level  Dummy variable (0/1) equals 1 if highest qualification is A’level 
O’level  Dummy variable (0/1) equals 1 if highest qualification is O’level  
Male  Dummy variable (0/1) equals 1 if individual is male 






















set mem 400m; 
set mat 800; 
set more off; 

















 RESULTS FILE 
 
tobit ldebt age lsav linc lhwealth marr emp degree alevel olevel male ind, ll(0); 
 
Tobit estimates                                   Number of obs   =       3579 
                                                  LR chi2(11)     =     407.08 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -6071.7422                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0324 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       ldebt |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         age |  -.1166167   .0149277    -7.81   0.000    -.1458843   -.0873491 
        lsav |  -.1110862   .0649746    -1.71   0.087    -.2384774    .0163049 
        linc |   .4988664   .1199528     4.16   0.000     .2636834    .7340494 
    lhwealth |  -.3126518   .0345654    -9.05   0.000    -.3804217   -.2448819 
        marr |   -.484894   .3150764    -1.54   0.124    -1.102642     .132854 
         emp |   1.087713   .3329233     3.27   0.001     .4349735    1.740452 
      degree |   .1925321   .3877163     0.50   0.620    -.5676358       .9527 
      alevel |   .4574903   .2892543     1.58   0.114    -.1096301    1.024611 
      olevel |  -.0971489   .3509876    -0.28   0.782    -.7853053    .5910076 
        male |   .4997765   .3007312     1.66   0.097    -.0898458    1.089399 
         ind |   1.187578   .2537143     4.68   0.000     .6901385    1.685018 
       _cons |  -.2806632   1.050006    -0.27   0.789    -2.339336     1.77801 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         _se |   7.121927   .1566116           (Ancillary parameter) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  Obs. summary:       2158  left-censored observations at ldebt<=0 
                      1421     uncensored observations  
mfx compute; 
 
Marginal effects after tobit 
      y  = Fitted values (predict) 
         = -1.2557238 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
variable |      dy/dx    Std. Err.     z    P>|z|  [    95% C.I.   ]      X 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
     age |  -.1166167      .01493   -7.81   0.000  -.145874 -.087359   44.7913 
    lsav |  -.1110862      .06497   -1.71   0.087  -.238434  .016262   1.80164 
    linc |   .4988664      .11995    4.16   0.000   .263763   .73397   6.16907 
lhwealth |  -.3126518      .03457   -9.05   0.000  -.380399 -.244905   2.64378 
    marr*|   -.484894      .31508   -1.54   0.124  -1.10243  .132644   .694049 
     emp*|   1.087713      .33292    3.27   0.001   .435195  1.74023    .65074 
  degree*|   .1925321      .38772    0.50   0.619  -.567378  .952442   .175189 
  alevel*|   .4574903      .28925    1.58   0.114  -.109438  1.02442   .406259 
  olevel*|  -.0971489      .35099   -0.28   0.782  -.785072  .590774   .214864 
    male*|   .4997765      .30073    1.66   0.097  -.089646   1.0892   .395641 
     ind |   1.187578      .25371    4.68   0.000   .690307  1.68485   1.20397 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 








 What do the marginal effects (Coefficients) mean from the Tobit?  
 
i.  A 1% increase in savings reduces debt by 11.1% 
ii.  If income goes up by 1% then debt increases by 49.9% 
iii.  Individuals with a degree have 19.3% more debt than those with 
no qualifications 
 
How much debt does the following individual have?  
 
a male individual aged 34 – Male=1;  
with no savings or wealth – lnSaving=0; lnWealth=0; 
income of £736.54 – lninc=6.602 
employed – Emp=1; 
married – Marr=1; 
with no education – Degree=0, O’level=0, A’level=0; 
who is financially optimistic – FEI=2?  
i i i i i i Married ˆ Wealth ˆ Income ˆ Saving ˆ Age ˆ ˆ y ˆ 5 4 3 2 1 0 ln ln ln β β β β β β + + + + + =  
 
i i i i i i FEI ˆ Male ˆ level ' O ˆ level ' A ˆ Degree ˆ Employed ˆ















































⎛ + + + + + + + + + + + = 2 ˆ 1 ˆ 0 ˆ 0 ˆ 0 ˆ 1 ˆ 1 ˆ 0 ˆ 602 . 6 ˆ 0 ˆ 34 ˆ ˆ ˆ 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 β β β β β β β β β β β β i y
 
 



























⎛ + + + 2 1876 . 1 1 49981 . 0 0  
 
 
49 . 12 £ 5256 . 2 ˆ = = i y  
 
 
browse pdebty pldebt debty ldebt if age==34 & lsav==0 & linc>6.6 & 
linc<6.602 & lhwealth==0 & marr==1 & emp==1 & alevel==0 & degree==0 & 













































Φ = < + < =
σ σ
ε i i i i
i i i i i i
y ˆ l y ˆ u
u ' l prob u , l prob β x  
 
 






































ˆ 9077 . 6




/***Probability that an individual has between 0 and £1000***/ 





sum p prob; What about the probability that the same individual (as defined above) has 
debt between £1,000 and £5,000?  
 





5256 . 2 9077 . 6
1219 . 7


























⎛ prob  
 
∴ A 7% probability 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 